REVIEWS
Ombudsmen and Human Rights: The New
U.N. Treaty Proposals
Frank C. Newman-It is this problem of the right of the individual to invoke the
Covenants in his own right and in his own behalf which I
respectfully commend to you as claiming the most earnest
attention on the part of the scholar and statesman, of the man
of thought and the man of action.1
On December 16, 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations
approved three remarkable documents: (1) the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (2) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and (3) the Optional Protocol to the
2
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Drafts of the documents, forwarded after eight years of study by the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, had been on the
Assembly's agenda for twelve years. Some observers had concluded that
certain clauses never would be accepted by influential governments. 3
t"Frank C. Newman is Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. For research
assistance he is grateful to Professor Michael Smith of Berkeley and the Boalt Hall
Committee on International Legal Studies.
1 Moskowitz, The Covenants on Human Rights: Basic Issues of Substance, 53 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 230, 234 (1959). Cf. Hoffman,
Implementation of InternationalInstruments of Human Rights, id. at 235: "At no point
of the history of the modern state system would the establishment of a mechanism which
would allow individuals to bring up complaints against their governments have failed to
provoke violent objections from state representatives."
2 U.N. Doc. No. AIRES/2200 (XXI) (1967). For a guide to the legislative history (not
analyzed in this article), see U.N. Doc. No. A/6546, at 4-8, 52-55 (1966). For U Thant's comments see U.N. Monthly Chron., Feb. 1967, p. 40.
3 See EZEJIOFoR, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER T=E LAW 137 (1964) ("concrete
results in this field can only be expected from groups of states who share the same conceptions of democracy and of the relationship between the state and the individual'); Buergenthal, The United Nations and the Development of Rules Relating to Human Rights, 59
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERIcAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 132, 136 (1965) ("for a
long time to come probably only regional international organizations will be able to establish an effective machinery for the protection of truly individual human rights'); Hoffman,
Panel Discussion, id. at 252 ("we cannot influence the way states treat their citizens; we
can only explain why'); IVaelbroeck, Le colloque de Vienne sur la Convention Europeene
des droits de l'homme, 1 REv. TRIM. DREDROIT EUROPiEN 553, 564 (1965) ("Il n'existerait pas
de droit de recours individuel .. . analogue A celui qui est prdvu par l'article 25 de la
Convention Europdene: cette carence, quoique grave, parait inevitable dans l'6tat actuel
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But objections apparently were met; the two Covenants were adopted
unanimously; and in its resolution-to-adopt, the Assembly expressed
hope "that the Covenants and the Optional Protocol will be signed and
ratified... without delay and come into force at an early date."4
Each covenant will come into force when thirty-five nations have
ratified. For the Protocol, ten nations are enough once the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant has become operative. To promote ratification the Assembly asked all governments and nongovernmental organizations "to publicize the text of these instruments as widely as
possible, using every means at their disposal, including all the appropriate media of information." 5
Thus, during the very week that enthusiasts in the United States
were celebrating the 175th anniversary of our own Bill of Rights, the
states of the world were challenged to enact a United Nations Bill of
Rights-idealized by revered statesmen for more than two decades. 6
Predictably, the politics of ratification-in America, for example-will
be complex and even perverse.7 Yet the endorsement of related treaties
des relations internationales.'); Hula, Book Review, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 885 (1966) ("the
Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . [is] still today a mere draft with very
little chance of ever becoming law proper'); ef. McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in the
United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 640 (1964).
4 U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/2200 (XXI), at 2 (1967). The unanimous votes are recorded in
U.N. Doc. No. A/PV.1496, at 27-29 (1966) (General Assembly), and in U.N. Doc. No.
A/6546, at 152 (1966) (Third Committee). In the Assembly the vote favoring the Protocol
was 66 to 2 with 38 abstentions; in the Third Committee, 59 to 2 with 32 abstentions, Togo
and Niger casting the negative votes. The amendment to separate the Protocol from the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant passed by vote of 41 to 39 with 16 abstentions. See id.
at 123. "Mr. Nasinovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) . . . was . . . glad that the
Protocol-which was unacceptable and, moreover, of secondary importance-was not contained in the body of the Covenant." U.N. Doc. No. A/C.3/SR 1455, at 11 (1966).
5 Id. at 44. The effective-date clauses are at 14, 33, 37, and 41.
6 See HUmAN RIGHTS: A SYmposium PREPARED BY UNESCO (1949); Blaustein, Human
Rights-A Challenge to the United Nations and to Our Generation, Dag Hammerskjold
Memorial Lecture, Columbia Univ., Dec. 4, 1963. Cf. IV Doc. Hisr. OF CONST. 411, 412
(1905) (Jefferson's letter to Madison, Dec. 20, 1787) ("A bill of rights is what the people are
entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, & what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.'); Schwelb, The United Nations and Human
Rights, 11 How. L.J. 356 (1965).
7 All three treaties "extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions." U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/2200, supra note 4, at 14, 37, 41; see McDougal & Bebr,
supra note 3, at 628 n.97; Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 996, 1054 n.67 (1966) ("The
United States, changing the position it had taken in the early years of the United Nations
work in the field of human rights-and also in other contexts-voted for the deletion of
the Federal States clause .. ."); Simsarian, Progress in Drafting Two Covenants on Human
Rights in the United Nations, 46 Amr. J. INT'L. L. 710, 716 (1952); 52 A.B.A.J. 400 (1966).
Cf. STEIN & JACOBSON, DxPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS AND POTrCLANs (1966); Oakland Tribune,
June 19, 1966, p. 18 (" 'The United Nations will be dictatorial and destructive of human
rights according to the prophecies in the Book of Revelation,' states the Rev. John Myers,
an Oakland author.'). See generally note 31 infra.
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by many nations suggests that these documents will become operative.8
It is necessary, therefore, to examine their texts and consider their
likely impact on individuals and governments.
The aim of this paper is to outline the "ombudsmen clauses" of the
documents, and also of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which the General Assembly
adopted unanimously on December 21, 1965. 9 The ombudsmen that
these clauses create are called the Human Rights Committee and the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The ombudsmen idea, the idea that ex officio experts can investigate and criticize
what the governors do that the governed do not like, has been expounded in America notably by Walter Gellhorn of Columbia and
Stanley Anderson of California. It enjoys great popularity vis-a-vis
national, state, and local affairs. 10 Its acceptance for worldwide concerns
is a radical innovation," and comments on the prospects internationally
8 See Schwelb, International Conventions on Human Rights, 9 INT'L & COasP. L.Q. 654
(1960); Marsh, Book Review, 15 INT'L & CoatP. L.Q. 311 (1966); cf. Status of Multilateral
Treaties in the Field of Human Rights Concluded Under the Auspices of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/907/Rev. 1 (1967).
9 U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/2106 (XX) (1966), reprinted in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 650 (1966).
See Dr. Schwelb's excellent analysis, The International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination,15 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 996 (1966). Cf. U.N. Doc. No.
E/CN.4/L.919/Add. 1, at 9 (1967) (draft re religious intolerance); Commission on Human
Rights, Report on the 22d Session, U.N. Doc. No. E/4184, at 83 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
22d Session Report] (measures for the speedy implementation of the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination); Ferguson, The United Nations Convention on Racial Discrimination: Civil Rights by Treaty, 1 IAW IN TRANSITON Q. 61
(1964); Whitehead, The Elimination of Racial Discrimination: The United Nations' Proposed Solution, 11 How. hJ. 583 (1965).
10 GELLHORN, OaMUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1966); GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN
(1966); Anderson, Ombudsmen Proposals,7 BULL. INST. Govr'L STUDIES, U.C. BEREELEY, No.
6 (1966); King, What This Country Needs Is a Good Ombudsman, Kiwanis Magazine, April
1967, at 23; Time, Jan. 20, 1967, p. 21; Unruh, The Need for an Ombudsman in California,
53 CA IF. L. REv. 1212 (1965); Symposium-The Ombudsman, 19 ADMIN. L. Rxv. 6-106
(1966); Newman, Book Review, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 784 (1967).
11 "[T]he Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination . . . is the first organ
of its kind established on a world-wide plane." Schwelb, supra note 9, at 1058. "[]n the
ten-year period from 1947 to 1957 . . . more than 63,000 communications charged specific
violations of human rights." Buergenthal, supra note 3, at 135 n.7. See Carey, The United
Nations' Double Standard on Human Rights Complaints, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 793 (1966)
("Most . . . communications .. . are given scant attention'); cf. id. at 799 (nations' comments on the Racial Discrimination Covenant); GARDNER, IN PUasusr oTFWORM ORaE 256
(1964) ("the right of individual petition to world-wide international bodies in humanrights cases is not a practical possibility at this time').
Most commentators have treated the concept of ombudsman as exportable nationally
but not internationally. See 22d Session Report 75 ("Some representatives, while expressing
their admiration for this institution [of ombudsman], felt that its application on an international scale was, at best, a remote objective.'); INTERNATIONAL CO MIssION OF JURISTs,
THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (1966) ("Control through the institution of an
ombudsman'); id. at 69-71; cf. Blix, A Pattern of Effective Protection: The Ombudsman,
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may illumine some variations on the theme. My hope is that readers
will be persuaded that the new United Nations committees could
contribute significantly to human rights progress.
I. THE RIGHT TO PETITION
The United Nations have never endorsed adequately, as a human
right, the right to petition one's own government. 1 2 The new Protocol,
however, states that individuals who believe that their rights enumerated in the Civil and Political Rights Covenant have been violated
"may submit a written communication to the [Human Rights] Committee for consideration." The Committee then (1) "shall bring any
[such] communications ... to the attention of the State... alleged to be
violating,"(2) "shall consider [such] communications in the light of all
written information made available to it by the individual and by the
State," (3) "shall forward its views to the State ...and to the individual," and (4) "shall include in its annual report ...a summary of its
activities"
We note immediately that this procedure applies only to the Civil
and Political Rights Covenant. Individuals who suffer because of violations of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant are given
no such remedy; and the Committee is powerless respecting the right
of everyone "to an adequate standard of living," "to education," "to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health," "to take part in cultural life," and similar rights. But the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant has immense scope. Its enumerations include basic criminal justice, equal protection of the law, first
amendment liberties such as free speech, free press, freedom of religion, and many "new" rights;' 3 for example: "Everyone shall have
in Symposium on The InternationalLaw of Human Rights, 11 How. L.J. 257, 386 (1965);
Smyth, The European Commission of Human Rights, in THE OMBUDSMIAN 162 (Rowat ed.
1965); see also notes 26 & 27 infra.
12 See DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS 65 (1951); cf. Gen. Ass. Res. 217 B(III),
Dec. 10, 1948 ("the right of petition is an essential human right'); LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 337 (1950) ("no Bill of Rights can disregard it');
Edmund G. Brown, The Right to Petition:Political or Legal Freedom? 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
729 (1961).
13 See articles 1-27 of the Covenant. For insights on non-Western implications see

Berman, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, 11 How. L.J. 333 (1965); Carey, Implementing Human Rights Conventions-The Soviet View, 53 KY. L.J. 115 (1964); Jakovljevic, The
Problem of the Protection of Human Rights and International Law, 1962-1963 YEARBOoK
OF HAG E Ac.; Korowicz, Protection and Implementation of Human Rights Within the
Soviet Legal System, 53 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL L w 248
(1959); Panel-Problems of Self-Determination and Political Rights in the Developing
Countries, 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 129-150 (1966);

Peselj, Recent Codification of Human Rights in Socialist Constitutions, 11 How. L.J. 342
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the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his

interests." (art. 22, § 1) "Every child shall have . . . the right to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State." (art. 24, § 1) "In those States
in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."
(art. 27) Thus, the Committee's cognizance is broad indeed.
II.

RESTRICTIONS AND PROCEDURE

There are, however, certain restrictions. First, individuals may
petition only (1) when they claim to be victims of a violation of a right
set forth in the Covenant, (2) when they are subject to the jurisdiction
of the government that they allege has violated that right, and (3) when
that government has ratified both the Protocol and the Covenant.
Second, the communication to the Committee must be written, must
not be anonymous, and must be neither "an abuse of the right of submission of such communications" nor "incompatible with the provi4
sions of the Covenant."'
Third, the Committee may not consider an individual's communication until it has ascertained (1) that he has exhausted all available
domestic remedies, and (2) that the same matter is not being examined
under another procedure of international investigation or settlement.
But this rule does not apply "where the application of the remedies is
unreasonably prolonged."
The Committee establishes its own rules of procedure.' 5 Twelve of
(1965); Zhogin, Vyshinsky's Distortions in Soviet Legal Theory and Practice,4 Sov=r L. &
Gov'r 48 (1965).
"[it is a shock to be told by the Vice President of the Soviet Supreme Court that
our system is not fair to the defendant. However, . . . to serve on a defendant a little
paper merely saying, 'You did such a thing at such a place and time, and you are
guilty of this or that crime,' and then to save the evidence to produce at the trial, may
not be the fairest method of conducting a trial to ascertain the guilt of the accused."
JACKSON, THE NURE BERG TRLAL 321 (1947).
14 See WEiL, THE EUROPEAN CONVENnON ON HUMAN RiCHTS 126 (1963). Cf. art. 5, § 1:

"Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction
of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater
extent than is provided for in the present Covenant." May we infer that those words do
not preclude activities aimed at restricting the Covenant by amendment, pursuant to its
Article 51? Cf. Schwelb, On the Operation of the European Convention on Human Rights,
18 INT. ORG. 558, 567 (1964); Smith, The European Convention on Human Rights and the
Right of Derogation:A Solution to the Problem of Domestic Jurisdiction, 11 How. L.J.
594, 601 (1965).

15 See also articles 37 & 39 of the Covenant.
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its eighteen members constitute a quorum; its decisions are by majority
vote of the members present; and it "shall hold closed meetings when
examining communications under the . . . Protocol." It must bring

each of these communications to the attention of the allegedly violating
government. "Within six months, the receiving State shall submit to
the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State."
Then, after considering each communication in the light of written
information made available by the individual and by the State, the
Committee forwards its views to both.
III.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMmiTTEE 16

The Committee is composed of eighteen nationals of countries that
have ratified the Covenant-"persons of high moral character and
recognized competence in the field of human rights, consideration
being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience." Each party to the Covenant may nominate two
of its nationals. The eighteen are elected by secret ballot at a parties'
meeting that the Secretary-General convenes. The elections are for
four-year terms, except that half of those first chosen serve only a twoyear term.
In the election "consideration shall be given to equitable geographical distribution of membership and to the representation of the different forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems." Though
two may be nominated, only one national of a State may be elected.
Committeemen are elected and serve "in their personal capacity," and
each receives "emoluments from United Nations resources on such
terms and conditions as the General Assembly may decide, having
regard to the importance of the Committee's responsibilities." The
Secretary-General is to provide staff and facilities for the "effective
performance" of the Committee's functions.
IV.

FUNcTIONS OTHER THAN CONSIDERING PETITIONS

My subject is ombudsmen. I will merely refer to important Committee functions that do not involve "communications from individuals." Briefly listed, they are (1) to request and receive from parties to
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant "reports on the measures they
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized ...

and on the

progress made in the enjoyment of those rights"; (2) to transmit reports
and "such general comments as it may consider appropriate" to the
parties, and also to the United Nations Economic and Social Council;
16 See articles 28-86, 38 & 43.
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(3) "to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State
Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations
under the present Covenant," then to "make available its good offices
... with a view to a friendly solution of the matter"; and (4) when the
matter cannot thus be resolved to those parties' satisfaction, with their
consent to appoint an ad hoc conciliation commission.
That is a quick summary which justifies only this comment: for
further details, articles 40-42 of the Covenant must be studied with
care. We can observe that item 3 in the list above might result in
action relating to an individual's grievance. To illustrate, consider
these words of article 13:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance
of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion
and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the
purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.
If an alien lawfully in the United States were denied any of those
rights, and if the United States had ratified the Covenant and also had
recognized the Committee's cognizance, under article 41, of complaints
by other countries, and if the alien could persuade another country
(e.g., his own) to plead for him, then, if that country too had declared
its desire to participate in article 41 proceedings, the Committee could
17
serve as ombudsman. Those are a lot of if's.

V. THE

CoMMrrrrE

ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The committee organized under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is to have functions comparable to those of the Human Rights Committee. The Convention,
like the Civil and Political Rights documents, provides that once it is
operative ten parties may empower the Committee to receive petitions.
Twenty-seven nations must ratify the Convention as a whole; and the
draftsmen assumed, of course, that not all governments who ratify will
choose to subject themselves to the Committee's jurisdiction.18
Differences between the Civil-Political and the Racial Discrimina17 Cf. Schwelb, supra note 9, at 1037. On individual petitions introduced via "comments"
from non-governmental organizations, see Carey, supra note 13, at 130; cf. 22d Session
Report, 106-17.
18 Cf. Buergenthal, Book Review, 13 Am. J. CoNp. L. 301, 305-06 (1964). The effectivedate clauses appear in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. at 659-60 (1966).
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tion procedures seem to be of limited significance. Thus, governments
charged with racial violations are allowed only three months instead
of six to submit exceptions; the racial committee's deliberations seem
not to be restricted to written information; and a secrecy requirement
is imposed.' 9 The Convention does include this unique paragraph
(art. 14, § 2):
Any State Party which makes a declaration [recognizing the
competence of the Racial Discrimination Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals] . . .
may establish or indicate a body within its national legal
order which shall be competent to receive and consider petitions from individuals and groups of individuals within its
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation of any of
the rights set forth in this Convention and who have exhausted other available local remedies.
The gain to a government that does set up such a petition-considering
body is that its accusers may then resort to the United Nations Committee only "in the event of failure to obtain satisfaction from the
body." (Art. 14, § 5) The gain to individuals is that they get another
body to watch over their government; and a national ombudsman,
though potentially subservient in some countries, will often be less
remote and more effective than the international committee. In our
country, for instance, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
might well be structured to help racial discrimination victims "obtain
satisfaction." In most cases (though not necessarily all), its services
20
would be superior to those of the Committee.
Thus, with respect to racial discrimination the creation of national
ombudsmen was pronounced worthwhile. As to human rights in
general, the Assembly was less ambitious, but it did approve the following invitation and request:
19 Cf. Schwelb, supra note 9, at 1043: "The principle of a fair hearing (Art. 10 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) requires ... that the petitioner should have an
opportunity to comment on the 'information' presented by the State and vice versa."
That idea would also apply to the Civil and Political Rights Protocol and would indeed
be a liberal extension of what we call "due process" and the British call "natural justice."
Compare requirements in Art. 11, § 5 of the Racial Discrimination Convention, with
Art. 41, § 1(g) of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant; and see Carey, supra note 11, at
803, nA9.
20 See Bernhard, Role of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 23 LAW IN
TRANSMON 107 (1963); cf. U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/932/Add. 2, at 2 (1967) ("This Commission offers a good example of . . . a National Commission in the field of human
rights.'); Taper, A Lover of Cities-l, New Yorker, Feb. 11, 1967, pp. 45, 104-10; Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for a Better Use of Administrative Process,74 YALE L.J. 1171 (1965).
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Considering the advisability of the proposals for the establishment of national commissions on human rights or the
designation of other appropriate institutions to perform
certain functions pertaining to the observance of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, [the General Assembly]
1. Invites the Economic and Social Council to request the
Commission on Human Rights to examine the question in
all its aspects and to report, through the Council, to the
General Assembly;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to invite Member States
to submit their comments on the question, in order that the
Commission on Human Rights may take these comments
21
into account when considering the proposals.
VI.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In three treaty proposals-the Civil and Political Rights Covenant,
its accompanying Protocol, and the Convention on Racial Discrimination-the United Nations have constructed two committees that could
serve powerfully as ombudsmen for worldwide human rights. Some
critics will continue to urge that the United Nations create a court and
appoint an attorney general or high commissioner for human rights,
and such officials may in fact be required for some needs.2 2 In response
to the need for external criticism, however, a fine structure has been
designed. The new committees can meet the tests of the formula set
out by Walter Gellhorn: "readily accessible, professionally qualified,
wholly detached critics to inquire objectively into asserted administrative shortcomings ...

advisors, not commanders... [who] rely on

recommendation, not on compulsion. '23 Are eighteen committeemen
21 Supra note 4, at 44. Should commissions on economic, social, and cultural rights
exercise ombudsman-like functions? The Third Committee's vote to seek a report and
comments on that question was 74 to 0; but the United States, the United Kingdom,
Portugal, and Japan abstained. U.N. Doe. No. A16546, at 158 (1966); cf. Papadatos, The
European Social Charter, 7 I.C.J.J. 214 (1966).
22 See Report of the Working Group to Study the Proposal to Create the Institution of a
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/934 (1967);
U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/L.974 (1967); Etra, InternationalProtection of Human Rights: The
Proposal for a U.N. High Commissioner, 5 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 150 (1966); Goldberg,
The Need for a World Court of Human Rights, 11 How. L.J. 621 (1965); cf. Brennan,
International Due Process and the Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1258 (1962); Carey, supra note 11,
at 794, 802; Simsarian, Human Rights Among Diverse World Orders, 53 PROCEEDINGS OF
THm AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 245, 247 (1959); Yntema, Book Review,
12 Am. J. Coip. L. 135 (1963).
23 GELLHORN, OMBUDSIEN AND OTHEats 422, 436 (1966). Query whether international
slowness and stiffness inevitably will impede efforts to achieve the quick, informal,
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too many? I think not. "Capability and objectivity . . . are qualities
that can be attributed to a collectivity as well as to a man," Gellhorn
reminds us, and "nothing in the concept of external criticism precludes a collegial organization instead of a one-man band. ' 24
That is not to say that revisions never will be necessary. All the
treaties we are discussing set forth a process of amendment, and the
ombudsmen clauses, like several other clauses, obviously could be
strengthened. 25 Also, by no means will it be easy for the committeemen
to "serve in their personal capacity," to insulate themselves from compulsions of global politics. Their work can be potent only if it is bold
and resourceful, only if it displays dedication and integrity and courage, in addition to the qualities that inhere in Gellhorn's prescription.
The critical fact, though, is that the right to petition an ombudsman-long sought as a basic reform in international affairs2 6-is now
recognized. The nurturing of that right is to begin as soon as enough
nations have ratified the Civil-Political Covenant and Protocol and
the Racial Discrimination Convention. Like many United Nations
agencies, the human rights ombudsmen will develop strengths, and
they will enhance the pioneer work of the European Commission of
Human Rights and other transnational bodies.27 That jurisprudence
negotiatory strength that can characterize the work of national ombudsmen. Would a
commissioner contribute? See note 22 supra.
24 GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 226 (1966).

25 Cf. Note, The Legal Programme of the Council of Europe, 14 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q.
646-47 (1965): "Three protocols to the European Convention on Human Rights were
signed in 1963. They extend the protection offered by the Convention. Experts are still
working on other proposals to extend the Convention, and the Legal Committee of the
Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly . . . is studying ways of ensuring a fuller
application .... " See also New Protocol on Status of Refugees, U.N. Press Release WS/279,
at 7 (Feb. 3, 1967).
26 See Bruegel, The Right to Petition an International Authority, 2 IN'T & CoMP. L.Q.
542 (1953); see also LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND HUMAN RIGHTS 291 (1950)
("we are not at liberty to permit the fundamental right of petition to founder').
27 Article 7 of the Protocol mentions the petition rights of colonial peoples. Cf. Schwelb,
supra note 9, at 1045-48. "The acceptance by United Nations bodies of petitions as well as
the hearing of petitioners on various subjects, including the denial of human rights, has
expanded from the trust territories contemplated by Article 87(b) [of the Charter] to
non-self-governing territories and even to one independent state, South Africa." Carey,
supra note 11, at 792; cf. U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/L.944/Add. 4, at 28 (1967) ("receive
communications and hear witnesses and use such modalities of procedure as ... appropriate [re South African prisoners]").
See also Simmonds, The United Kingdom and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 15 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 539 (1966); Thirlway, A New Jurisdiction: The European
Convention on Human Rights, 110 SOL. J. 299 (1966); McNulty, The Practice of the
European Commission of Human Rights, 11 How. L.J. 430 (1965); cf. Gormley, The
Emerging Protection of Human Rights by the International Labour Organization, 30
ALBANY L. REv. 13, 21 (1966); Thomas & Thomas, The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, 20 Sw. LJ. 282, 293 (1966).
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could be instructive on some important issues is quite apparent; for
example, when is the application of domestic remedies "unreasonably
28
prolonged"?
The Great Question of course is ratification. These proposed treaties, like other human rights treaties now in effect, 29 demonstrate
dramatically the world's repudiation of this dismal dictum of John
Foster Dulles:
[W]hile we shall not withhold our counsel from those who
seek to draft a treaty or covenant on human rights, we do not
ourselves look upon a treaty as the means which we would
now select as the proper and most effective way to spread
throughout the world the goals of human liberty to which
this Nation has been dedicated since its inception ....
[Specifically, the Eisenhower] administration does not intend
to sign the Convention on Political Rights of Women . . .
because we do not believe that this goal can be achieved by
treaty coercion or that it constitutes a proper field for exercise
of the treaty-making power.30
Those words have not yet had a decent burial. We have witnessed mere
preliminary rituals. 31 How humiliating it is is that the United States

has ratified not a single United Nations convention on human rights.
How belittling that, notwithstanding the Dulles comment regarding
"treaty coercion" and what is not "a proper field for exercise of the

treaty-making power," the Convention on Political Rights of Women
has now been ratified by more than fifty nations.3 2 How presumptuous
28 See GELLnoRN,

OMUDSMEN AND

WEIL, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
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("Exhaustion of Remedies");

cf. Mummery, The
Content of the Duty to Exhaust Local Judicial Remedies, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 389 (1964);
Panel-Usinga Country's Own Legal System to Cause It to Respect InternationalRights,
58 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANIF~aCAN SOCarIEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-122 (1964).
29 See note 8 supra.
30 U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE U.N.: REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE
YEAR 1953, at 155; cf. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 221 (1962).
31 See Gardner, Human Rights-Some Next Steps, 49 DEP'r STATE BULL. 320 (1963);
cf. Gardner, The InternationalPromotion of Human Rights: Problems and Opportunities,
State Dep't Press Release No. 4333 (Dec. 6, 1963); Cleveland, Switch On the Lights, State
Dep't Press Release No. 199 (April 30, 1964); Goldberg, State Dep't Press Release No. 4887
(July 6, 1966) at 13: "And the importance of international progress here cannot be overstated. For just as it is in the interest of the developed nations to encourage the use of
multilateral institutions and machinery to advance the economic growth of the less
developed nations, so it is in the interest of all nations to do so in the realm of human
rights."
32 In 1963 President Kennedy did submit to the Senate the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, along with the slavery and forced labor conventions. Cf. note 8 supra;
see Carey, supra note 13, at 115 n.2; Gardner, ICY Plus One: An Inventory, Saturday
Review of Literature, Nov. 5, 1966, pp. 24, 73; Hearings on Human Rights Conventions
ON HUMAN

RIGHTS 104 (1963);
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that we baldly urge the United Nations to "encourage all eligible States
to become Parties as soon as possible to all Conventions which aim to
,
How awkprotect human rights and fundamental freedoms ..
ward that our delegates still must resort to this hollow, tiresome, "Anyway we're better than you" dialogue:
It was significant [certain delegates observed] that some delegations most strongly supporting the establishment of a High
Commission for Human Rights represented Governments
which had a very poor record in the matter of ratifying such
instruments. In reply, one representative said that, without
belittling the importance of ratifying such instruments which
were given very careful consideration in his own country, a
more important test was the degree in which the principles
34
of such instruments were observed.
It is true that in the United States such instruments are given "very
careful consideration"? I fear not. With due consideration of the new
treaties, the most crucial treaties on human rights yet adopted, our
nation could mend its ways. For freedom, once again, America might
assume a leader's role-a role that history, past and present, surely
commands.
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1967).
33 22d Session Report, 39; cf. U.N. Doc. No. EfSR.1412, at 69 (1966).
34 22d Session Report, 73.
"[T]he Russians . . . brought in their hardest-hitting spokesman . . . . [A]s I sat and
listened to him, I felt indeed like the 'embarrassed American,' described in an article in
the Saturday Review [Oct. 31, 1964, p. 24], which pointed out the harmful effects on the
credibility of our role in the international human rights field of our record of nonratification ....
We participate in drafting human rights treaties, in criticizing them, in
proposing this additon and that deletion-and then we fail to ratify any of them.
"Of course, we . . . retorted that America does not need to ratify a genocide treaty in
order to prevent genocide; ... and we do not need a convention on the right to leave one's
country and to return ... and so forth.
"This was all fine as polemic, but it could not hide the fact that we have failed to
ratify any human rights conventions, which are the principal U.N. means of international
standard-setting and cooperation in the human rights field." Abram, The Quest for
Human Dignity, Vista, Sept.-Oct., 1966, p. 35. See also Goldberg, State Dep't Press Release
No. 4855, at 6 (May 12, 1966): "Our delay in ratifying these conventions has confused our
friends and provided ammunition against us for our foes." Cf. EZEJ1OFOR, PROTEcrION OF
HUMAN RIGHTs UNDER THE LAw 145 n.20 (1964) ("It is difficult to see what chances the
[Inter-American] Convention has of early adoption unless the U.S.A. relaxes its opposition.'); Korey, Human Rights Treaties: Why Is the U.S. Stalling?, 45 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 414
(1967); and see THOaSAs & THOAs, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 233 (1963).

